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The general perception of unions in the Guatemalan business community has been 
that they have a negative effect on firms.  Although this is a strong statement, 
there are very few studies of unionization in Guatemala, and most of them are 
only descriptive.  This paper provides an econometric analysis of the impact of 
unions on productivity in Guatemala, specifically on the production of coffee. 
Although union density is low, we conclude from the empirical analysis that there 
is evidence that unions when present have a negative effect on the productivity of 
large coffee plantations.   
 
We use different estimations of a production function and the effect of 
unions on productivity.  The first uses a union dummy and other independent 
variables, such as a capital proxy, the proportion of administrative and permanent 
workers, land per worker, total workers, farm elevation above sea level and a 
union dummy.  The second uses these same equations, but with interaction terms 
between the original variables and the union dummy.   
 
The results show that these other variables, when significant, had a 
positive effect on productivity.  The only is total workers, which could be 
indicating that diseconomies of scale are present.  As for the interaction terms, 
when a union is present, the productivity of variables such as land per worker and 
height is reduced significantly.  Also, it seems that capital has a larger effect on 
unionized farms productivity than on non-unionized farms.  The presence of 
permanent workers on farms, both in unionized and non-unionized settings, has a 
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  4Introduction 
 
The standard view of trade unions is that their purpose is to improve the material welfare of their 
members, principally by raising wages above the competitive level.  There is an enormous body 
of literature documenting the impact of unionism on wages.  There is also a smaller body of 
literature examining the impact of unionism on other variables, such as wage dispersion 
(Freeman, 1986), productivity (Clark, 1980), investment (Machin and Wadhani, 1991) and 
employment (Boal and Pencavel, 1994).  
According to several large coffee producers in Guatemala, the general belief is that 
unions have a negative effect on productivity.  In several cases unions have even been blamed 
for the bankruptcy of firms.  This perception explains the negative attitude of the private sector 
towards unions.  It is interesting to point out that even though this has been the general 
assumption for a long time, there are apparently no studies so far that have tried to quantify this 
effect.  Until now the most that has been published are several descriptive documents, which 
present an inconclusive exchange of opinions.  Some are limited to mentioning the bias of labor 
legislation in favor of unionization and its possible economic effects, without presenting hard 
evidence (CIEN, 1999). 
This paper provides an econometric analysis of the impact of unions on a sample of large 
coffee plantations, specifically the impact of unions on productivity, measured as coffee 
production per worker.  First, an equation is estimated using as independent variables a capital 
proxy, the proportion of administrative and permanent workers, land per worker, total workers, 
farm elevation above sea level and a union dummy.  From this equation it is concluded that 
unions have a negative effect on productivity. 
A similar equation is then estimated, but also including interaction terms between the 
regular variables and the union dummy.  The union coefficient in this equation, when significant, 
is positive.  When a union is present, however, the effect on productivity of the land and height 
variables is reduced significantly.  Also, the effect of capital on unionized firms’ productivity is 
larger than on that of nonunionized firms.  There is also strong evidence that diseconomies of 
scale are present in large coffee plantations. 
Also tested was whether the overall effect of unions on this last equation was negative.  
The coefficients of these regressions were used to calculate the predicted level of productivity at 
the means of all the control variables, and for two alternative values of the union dummy (zero 
  5and one).  The results of calculating this values when there is a union present are always lower 
than those when it is not present. 
  The paper is divided into six sections.  Section 1 briefly presents the background of 
coffee production in Guatemala.  Section 2 describes unionization in Guatemala, its size and 
relevance in the labor force, legislation on unions and the practices of unions. Section 3 describes 
the data used for the large coffee producers sample (at the establishment level).  Section 4 
presents a brief theoretical overview of unions and the impact of unionization on productivity.  
Finally, the empirical results are summarized in Section 5, and Section 6 presents the 
conclusions.  
 
1. Background  
 
Importance of Coffee Production 
 
Coffee started to be cultivated intensively in Guatemala during the second half of the nineteenth 
century.  Since then, production has expanded continuously, and coffee has become one of the 
main products of the Guatemalan economy.  Guatemala’s climate, volcanic soil and mountainous 
territory with different altitudes make it a propitious place not only for coffee production in 
general, but also for the development of many varieties, each with a different flavor and aroma 
(ANACAFE, 1997). 
Currently, the coffee sector represents approximately 7 percent of gross domestic product 
(GDP) and 2.5 percent of the national territory is used for coffee cultivation.  The close 
correlation between general economic growth and the level of international coffee prices 
illustrates its importance.  The economy generally is booming when international coffee prices 
are hig,h and growth slackens when prices are low (ANACAFE, 1997). 
During the last decade coffee represented between 25 percent and 35 percent of total 
exports.  In 1999 coffee export volume was 268,306 thousand kilos, while in 2000 export volume 
reached 290,384 thousand kilos.  This represented export earnings of US$561 million in 1999 
and US$574 million in 2000.  It is important to note that, although export volume increased by 
8.2 percent between 1999 and 2000, earnings increased by only 2.2 percent for the same period.  
This is attributed mainly to the fact that international coffee prices have gone down during this 
period (BANGUAT, several years). 
  6 
Another indicator of the importance of the coffee sector in the Guatemalan economy is 
the amount of manual labor it absorbs.  Agriculture as a whole employs 40 percent of the 
economically active population, of which the coffee sector absorbs approximately 40 percent.  
This means that approximately 1.7 million people work in the coffee sector (ANACAFE, 1997).  
A national survey, however, only accounts for 600,000 persons working in this sector (INE, 
2000).
1   
There are almost 7,000 coffee producers in Guatemala, organized through a national 
association called ANACAFE.  This association classifies producers into four main groups:  A) 
large producers: farms producing more than 2,000 one-hundred pound bags per year; B) midsize 
producers: farms producing between 1,000-2,000 one-hundred pound bags per year; C) small 
producers: farms producing between 100-1,000 one-hundred pound bags per year; and D) 
cooperatives of very small producers: farms that produce less than 100 one-hundred pound bags 
per year.   
About 300 farms are registered as large producers, and this category accounts for almost 
80 percent of total coffee production in Guatemala (González, 2001).   
 
Labor Market  
 
Table 1 presents some information for the Guatemalan labor market in 1999, obtained from the 
National Survey on Family Income and Expenses 1998-1999 compiled by the National Institute 
of Statistics (INE) and from the 1999 Bulletin of Labor Statistics of the Labor Ministry, the latest 
employment statistics available.  
According to the Labor Ministry and INE, the unemployment rate for 1999 was less than 
2 percent, which is low compared to the levels observed in developed countries.  The main 
reason is probably the absence of unemployment insurance (public or private) in Guatemala.  
Another reason is that labor market participation in itself is low (50.5 percent of the total 
population).  Additionally, a high proportion of the population is employed in the agricultural 
                                                 
1 The discrepancies can be attributed to survey procedures.  ANACAFE might account several times for the same 
workers, since many of them travel from farm to farm depending on the labor demand.  As for INE, the low number 
might be that the date when the census was made there was a low demand of workers because of seasonal reasons.  
Also, many farms harvest several agricultural products; this could be biasing both sources.  This explanation is only 
an opinion from the authors. 
  7sector, which is characterized by a high degree of informality.  About 30 percent of the 
economically active population contributes to the social security system, but in the agriculture 
sector this proportion is less than 10 percent.  One reason might be that work in this sector is 
mostly seasonal, so its contribution is not measured in the formal labor sector. 
 
Table 1.  General Employment Statistics for Guatemala (1999) 
 
   
Total population  10.5 million 
•  Urban population   39.7%
•  Rural population  60.3%
Total population in working age (7 years or older)  79.0%
Total economically active population *  50.5%
•  Male  66.8%
•  Female   35.2%
•  Urban   52.7%
•  Rural  48.8%
Total inactive working population  49.5%
Annual growth rate of formal employment (1990-98) **  1.5%
Employment by economic activity 
•  Agriculture 
•  Commerce 




Participation of economic activity as percentage of GDP 
•  Agriculture 
•  Commerce 





•  Average monthly wage (nominal) 
•  Minimum wage per working day, non agricultural activities 




Sources: INE (1999), Labor Ministry (1999). 
*Includes males and females in the age of 7 years or older who are working, engaged in productive 
 activities or searching for a job.  
** Measured by affiliates of the Instituto Guatemalteco de Seguridad Social (IGSS). 
 
In Guatemala the labor market is characterized by a high degree of informality, which is 
even higher in agriculture.  The agriculture sector employs more than a third of the economically 
active population but pays lower wages on average because it attracts workers with very poor 
schooling and literacy levels. 
 
  82.  Unions in Guatemala 
 
General Labor Legal Framework 
 
The Political Constitution of the Republic, the Labor Code (Decree 1441), the Civil Service Law, 
and the international agreements and treaties subscribed to by Guatemala regulate the labor 
market.  Guatemalan labor legislation is inspired by the principle that legal protection must favor 
workers and therefore grants a minimum and non-waiveable set of rights.  These principles are 
established first in the Political Constitution of the Republic and enforced by general norms like 
the Labor Code and the Civil Service Law.  Also, they are considered “obtained rights” which 
cannot be diminished but only improved, even if the worker and employer reach an agreement to 
diminish them or to replace them by others.   
According to this legal framework, one of the minimum rights enforced is the right to the 
minimum wage for the workers of the private sector, which must cover the “material, moral and 
cultural needs” of the worker and his family.  Other minimum rights refer to the pre-established 
number of working days per week; maximum work hours per day and month; wage levels 
depending on the (for example, regular weekdays, weekends, after-hours, etc.); labor benefits;
2 
payment of lost wages for damages caused by dismissal; and freedom to unionize and strike. 
The hiring of agricultural workers (laborers, day laborers, cattle dealers, and others) is 
also regulated by the Labor Ministry, guided by Labor Code Articles 138 to 145.  The Labor 
Code allows the improvement of the minimum benefits established in the labor legislation, 
depending on what other employers usually offer, what must be granted legally and according to 
their economic capacity.  It is important to note that the legislation indicates that the minimum 
guarantees may only be improved if the employer is (economically) able.   
Wages may be paid based on unit of time (per month, two weeks, week day or hour), on 
work unit (per piece, task, raised price or piecework) or based on participation in the utilities or 
sales of the company, without the worker assuming the risks of losses that the employer faces 
(Articles 88 to 96 of the Labor Code).  Generally, the employer initially determines the wage 
level and thereafter it may be negotiated with the worker.  Wages cannot be lower than the 
minimum wage established by the Labor Ministry.  
                                                 
2 Benefits include vacations (4.11 percent of the total annual wage), severance payments, thirteenth and fourteenth 
monthly salary (16.66 percent of the total annual wage), productivity bonuses; and payments to the Guatemalan 
Social Security Institute (13 percent of the total annual wage), the Workers Recreation Institute and the National 
Institute of Technology and Qualification (2 percent of the total annual wage).  
  9The minimum wage is established by the National Wage Commission, which is linked to 
the Labor Ministry.  The Parity Commission is composed of two employers and two unionized 
workers, and a Labor Ministry inspector advises this commission.  If the National Wage 
Commission cannot reach an agreement on the minimum wage, the President of the Republic 
makes a final decision.  This must be done every year. 
Wages can only be paid in legal currency, and it is expressly prohibited to make payment 
in whole or part in merchandise, bonds, cards, coupons or any other form that may replace 
currency.  However, workers in agricultural activities or cattle-raising activities may obtain a 
maximum of 30 percent of their total wage payment in food and other articles used for their own 
immediate personal consumption or for their relatives who depend economically on them, to be 
provided by the employer at cost or less. 
 
Legal Framework of Unions 
 
To unionize is a basic right for the workers, based on the right of free association guaranteed by 
Article 34 of the Political Constitution of the Republic (1985) and International Labor Treaty 
Number 87 of the International Labor Organization (ILO) on Union Freedom.  This treaty dates 
from 1948, was ratified by Guatemala in 1952 and was formulated as an inalienable right of 
workers in the Political Constitution of 1985 (Article 102, Interjection q).  The right of free 
unionization of workers employed in private companies is established in the Labor Code and its 
modifications.
3  The enforcement of this right was also an important issue during the peace 
negotiations between the Guatemalan government and the guerrilla movement in 1996.
4 
  According to the Labor Code, union associations require the enrollment of at least twenty 
workers and are classified by their nature as: 
a.  Agricultural unions: constituted by agricultural workers or employees of agricultural 
or cattle holding companies, or people with independent professions in cattle holding 
or agriculture.  
b.  Urban unions: all those not included within the activities of agricultural unions.   
 
                                                 
3 In July 2001 the Labor Code went through a major reform that strengthened the position of unions. These changes, 
however, are not included in this study. 
  10Unions can also be classified as: 
a.  Guild unions: those formed by workers of the same profession or those of the same 
economic activity if employees are concerned.  
b.  Company unions: formed by workers of different professions that provide services to 
the same company or two or more equal companies.   
 
Some basic legal principles that must prevail always in all the unions are the respect of the will 
of the majority, secret balloting and one vote per person. 
  Since freedom of association and unionization rights are recognized, it is prohibited to 
dismiss workers for participating in the formation of a union.  No one can be forced to join a 
union, nor can anybody be dismissed for belonging to a union.  Workers enjoy the right of non-
dismissal from the moment they notify the General Labor Directorate of the Labor Ministry that 
they are forming a union and enjoy this protection up to sixty days after the publication of its 
statutes in the official newspaper.  However, if during this period the worker commits an act that 
is defined in the Labor Code as a cause for dismissal, the employer is allowed to initiate, in the 
labor courts, a procedure to cancel the labor contract and authorize his dismissal.  The right of 
non-dismissal extends for union officials as long as they remain in office and until one year after 
they leave their position in the union leadership. 
  Unions are the only labor organizations recognized by law, and only unions can negotiate 
collective agreements and call for strikes.  Collective bargaining is carried out only at the 
establishment level and the agreement applies to all workers, unionized and non-unionized.   
Although all workers benefit from a collective agreement, only unionized workers pay 
membership fees.  These fees, which vary from union to union, are usually a percentage of 
salary.  When a legal strike is held, the employer must continue paying his employees for as long 
as the strike lasts, and is not allowed to hire additional workers to replace them.  Employers 
assume indefinitely all costs of a strike, as long as it is legal and fair.  For a strike to be declared 
legal it must comply with all the legal requisites, and for it to be declared fair a labor court must 
                                                                                                                                                               
4 Guatemala’s civil war began in the mid-1960s.  This war officially ended in 1996 when the Government and the 
guerrillas signed the Peace Agreements, which, besides ending the war, included an extensive program to raise the 
social and economic conditions of the population. 
  11declare that the union is justified in its demands.
5  The only other restriction on the right to strike 
is in the agriculture sector, where a union cannot call a strike during harvest time. 
Although unionization is a right guaranteed by the Constitution, employers may engage 
in different strategies to discourage union formation.  Many of these are not forbidden by the 
current legislation, but others can be considered to be outside the legal framework.  As the Labor 
Ministry does not collect statistics on illegal actions by employers against unions, information on 
these practices comes from interviews with lawyers and union officials.  Some of these strategies 
are: 
a.  Firing workers.  It is illegal to dismiss anyone trying to form a union once a 
formal request is presented at the Labor Ministry.  Some employers anticipate 
this stage and fire union promoters before the official request is made. 
b.  Non-compliance with union requirements.  Employers can look for any 
violation in the formation of a union.  If the procedure is not fully complied 
with, the Labor Ministry is forced to dissolve the union. 
c.  Promote alternative associations.  Although unions are the only labor 
organization recognized by law, employers can promote other types of 
associations.  Such is the case of a “solidarismo,” a non-profit association of 
employers and employees.  The advantage of this association is the perceived 
good will among its members, contrary to the perceived aggressiveness of 
unions by employers.  Moreover, there are no legal prohibitions on the 
coexistence of a union and other organizations in the same company.  This 
may dilute the power of a union within the company. 
d.  Hiring rules and human resources management.  Employers can develop 
informal rules where they hire special personnel to inform management of 
problems within the workforce or plans of forming a union.  Companies may 
also develop a policy of not contracting anyone who has been a union member 
or has worked in a company that has or had a union.  Another strategy is to 
hire only temporary personnel. 
                                                 
5 A fair strike is when the reasons that motivated it are caused by the employer, due to non-compliance with  
individual contracts or collective agreements, or because the employer unjustly denied the workers a raise or any 
other benefit when he is able to grant it (Labor Code, Article 242).  
  12e.  Other strategies. Employers can engage in actions that, although not 
necessarily illegal, might be considered unethical.  Such is the case of bribing 
workers to stop from unionizing by giving them money or promotions.   
Another action is to fragment the firm so that there are not enough employees 
in each firm to form a union.  Some union members have reported illegal 
actions such as threats and physical harm, but it is difficult to confirm the 
veracity of these claims, since most cases never reach the judicial system.  
Most of these conflicts are resolved privately between the interested parties, 
many times due to the high costs of resolving them in the judicial system.  
 
Generally, employers will try to stop a union from forming in their firm, because it is 
perceived that they have a strong negative effect on the productivity.  This reduction in 
productivity may be achieved through different ways.  For example, a union has the legal power 
to force the employer to accept a collective agreement, which he cannot refuse.  Moreover, if the 
employer still refuses to accept the agreement, unions have the right to call strikes, but they do 
not bear any of the costs if the strike is declared legal and fair.   
Regarding collective labor agreements, the law does not provide any restrictions on what 
may be included.  As a result, union officials tend to demand various privileges that usually do 
not take into account the reality of the firm.  This may take the form of additional wages and 
benefits that are not linked in any way to productivity.  In addition, restrictions may be placed on 
the contracting of workers and on working practices (Fernández Molina, 1996, González, 2001 
and Contreras, 2001). 
For example, in the collective agreements on coffee plantations there are detailed 
restrictions concerning employees’ duties.  Sometimes it goes as far as detailing the number and 
size of holes for new plants that an employee can dig on a working day.  Some also establish 
how many plants and to what height the employees can prune them during the working day. 
These restrictions have several effects. First, they usually keep employee productivity 
under its optimal level.  It is observed that similar workers on the same farm, but hired under 
agreements that do not impose these restrictions, achieve higher yields.  As a result, employers 
may be forced to hire additional workers to get the tasks done on time (González, 2001). 
  13These agreements may also reduce productivity by delaying technological improvements.  
Because of the degree of detail in which the contracts are written, employers introducing 
technological changes can be accused of violating the agreement before the labor courts.  By law 
collective agreements are valid for only one year, but they are renewed automatically for an 
additional year if none of the parties indicates that they want to renegotiate.  Usually employers 
are not willing to initiate new negotiations just to change a few working practices, because a new 
agreement usually implies more benefits for workers.  The law also establishes that benefits can 
only be increased; once given they can never be taken away (González, 2001). 
As can be seen, once a union is created it might be very harmful to a firm.  Nonetheless, 
employers have available many effective ways of stopping unions before they form.  Moreover, 
unions have a limited scope of influence: they can only negotiate a collective agreement for the 
workers in a single firm, never for an industry or an economic sector.  This might help explain 
the low density of unions in the labor force. 
 
Size and Importance of Unions 
 
In 1999 the total population of Guatemala consisted of 10.5 million inhabitants, of whom 50.5 
percent constituted the economically active population (EAP). According to Labor Ministry 
estimates, in May 1999 there were 1,389 union organizations in Guatemala, with 94,878 
members.  Therefore, unionized workers represented only 1.7 percent of the EAP, and the 
average number of members per union was 68.  Most of the unions are concentrated in the 
central and the southwestern region of the country (consisting of the departments of Guatemala, 
Sololá, Totonicapán, Quetzaltenango, Retalhuleu, Suchitepéquez and San Marcos).
6 
 
Table 2.  Enrolled Unions, Number of Affiliates by Sector (1999) 
Concept  Total  Public Sector  Private Sector 
Organizations 1,389  401  988 
Affiliated  workers  94,878 34,929 59,949 
   Source: Ministerio de Trabajo, Boletín Estadístico 1999 
 
                                                 
6 “[I]t is difficult to establish with certainty how many organizations are active and how many workers are 
unionized.  Very often not even union leaders, independently of the organization size, have at hand this information”  
(Morales Modenesi and de León, 1995).  
  14Of the 1,389 union organizations registered with the Labor Ministry in 1999, slightly over 
a third (35.56 percent) were considered to be active organizations (with their own legal 
personality and renewal of the executive committees).  For that same year, unionized workers 
represented 1.7 percent of the economically active population, and the average number of 
affiliated workers per union was 68.  According to Labor Ministry estimates for 1997, although 
76.5 percent of the unions operated in the private sector, they only amounted to 2 percent of 
workers in this sector.   
 
Table 3.  Enrolled Unions, Federations and Confederations (1943 to 1997) 
Legal status  Total 
enrollments 
Public Sector  Private Sector 
Unions 1,222  293  929 
Federations 48  6  42 
Confederations 5  0  5 
Totals 1,275  299  976 
               Source: Labor Ministry, Boletín Estadístico 1997. 
 
Unions are usually associated with national organizations or federations, which in turn 
belong to larger associations called confederations (see Table 3).  Besides the fees that affiliated 
unions pay to these federations and confederations, these larger associations usually also have 
some sponsorship from foreign labor organizations.  It is common for unions to change 
frequently from federation to federation.  It is also common, due to the low density of 
unionization, for other social organizations such as peasant groups to belong federations.  In 
general, unions are very rare, especially in the private sector, and are very decentralized.   
In 1997, 50.6 percent of the unions were concentrated in the agricultural sector, 21.8 
percent in personal services and 13 percent in industrial activity. The largest unions, based on the 
average number of affiliates, were those of electricity, gas and water (565 members); followed 
by transport, storage and communications (157 members). The unions with the smallest number 
of affiliates were those in commerce, restaurants and hotels (44 members) and agriculture (50 
members). Several problems limit the organization and operation of unions. These problems 
include low levels of motivation, awareness and formation of union organizations, as well as a 
loss of credibility in the leadership of several unions. Actions undertaken by employers to avoid 
the formation of unions also limit participation (Morales Modenesi and de León, 1995). 
 
  15Table 4.  Number of Unions by Economic Activity (1943 to 1997) 
  Number of affiliated workers 
Economic activity  Total 
enrollments by 
activity  
Total  Females  Males 
Totals 1,275  97,523  9,274  88,249 
Agriculture 646  32,315  1,492  30,823 
Operation of Mines and Quarries  4  228  0  228 
Manufacture industry  167  13,335  1,783  11,552 
Electricity, Gas and Water   6  3,389  104  3,285 
Construction 20  2,395  103  2,292 
Commerce, 
Restaurants and Hotels  
38 1,673  622  1,051 
Financial activities  30  3,152  689  2,463 
Personal services   278  32,568  4,214  28,354 
Not specified   40  1,246  103  1,143 
 
      Source: Labor Ministry, Boletín Estadístico 1997. 
 
The average number of workers per union in agriculture is low compared to other 
productive sectors.  This is because agricultural activities are mainly seasonal, with most workers 
hired temporarily, which makes it more difficult to form a labor association.  It is concluded that 
union associations in rural areas do not have the same presence as those in urban areas.  More 
detailed data about the size and importance of unions in Guatemala can be found in Annex 1. 
In the coffee sector, official information on unions is very scarce and unreliable.   
According to the Labor Ministry, between 1947 and 2000 19 agricultural unions have been 
authorized, of which five were in the coffee sector.  Until March 2001, only two of these unions 
were legally recognized, and only one had a collective bargaining agreement on working 
conditions (Rolando, 2001).  However, members of ANACAFE estimate that on about 10 
percent of the large farms the employees are unionized (more than 30 farms), but there are no 
official or private statistics to support this information.  Therefore, a survey was designed to 
obtain more reliable information about unions in the coffee sector (see Annex 4). 
 
3.  Data  
 
The data used for the analysis of coffee production were collected directly through a survey of 
100 coffee producers (see Annex 4).  The response rate to the survey was 65 percent.  However, 
it was necessary to remove from the sample those producers that did not provide data for 4 
  16consecutive years between 1992 and 2000.  The study uses data for 37 producers.  Table 5 shows 
the number of firms per year used in this study. 
 
Table 5.  Unbalanced Panel Data Description 
 















This variable was measured in one hundred pound bags of pergamino coffee per year.   
Pergamino coffee is obtained after the process of seeding (eliminating the fruit and obtaining 
only the seed).  Measurement of output in physical units avoids the problem mentioned by Booth 
(1995) and Clark (1980) when production is measured in value added.  In that case observed 
differences in productivity may result from high prices, overestimating the true productivity 





This variable measures the number of workers, which are divided into:  
a.  Temporary workers or jornaleros: workers who fulfill activities related to fieldwork, 
such as coffee harvesting and plant maintenance. These workers do not live on the 
plantations and are hired solely for specific activities.  According to current 
legislation, the average duration of these contracts must be less than ninety days for a 
worker to be considered temporary; afterwards the relationship is considered 
permanent. 
  17b. Permanent  workers  or  colonos: workers who perform the same activities as the 
temporary workers but generally live on the plantation premises on a permanent 
basis.  This generates additional costs for the producer.  These types of workers tend 
to unionize, since they have a long-term labor relationship with the employer.  
c.  Administrative workers: the administrators of the farm, personnel staff (i.e., engineers 
or agronomists), workers in charge of the payroll or planilleros, butlers, teachers, and 
nurses (the latter two when the plantation provides primary education and health care 
to its permanent employees).  
 
It must be noted that there may be an important bias in the employment measurement.  
The economic literature generally considers the labor unit as one employee, but in the case of 
Guatemala this is not always the case, especially in agriculture. While the employer negotiates a 
labor contract with an employee, the employee’s whole family, including spouse and children, 




For all agricultural products land is an indispensable input.  In this case land is measured by the 
area planted with coffee on each farm.  It is important to notice that there were several farms that 
harvested other products, such as sugarcane, rubber and lumber.  The unit of measurement unit 
was manzanas, a local measurement equivalent to 0.6988 hectares. 
Another relevant feature of the land input is the height at which the farm is located.  This 
has a distinguishing impact on the life cycle of the plant and in the quality of the coffee bean.  At 
higher altitudes, a better coffee quality is expected.  This variable was measured in feet above sea 
level.  Since portions of the same farm may lie at different heights, a simple average of the 




Due to the special characteristics of coffee production
 (see Annex 3), capital investment is not 
measured by the traditional variables (cost of equipment or machinery), but by planting, 
                                                                                                                                                               
7 Although coffee prices are set internationally, it is sold with premiums or discounts due to the quality of the bean, 
which is established, among other things, by the height of the farm and the variety of the plant. 
  18renovation and maintenance of coffee plants.  These activities were measured by the following 
proxies: 
a.  Whether a tree nursery is used or not; 
b.  Whether plants are grafted or not; 
c.  Number of plants seeded per hole; 
d.  Number of times plants are fertilized; 
e.  Distance between plants; 
f.  Use of traditional or higher technological methods of fieldwork and harvesting. 
 
These variables represent a very broad definition of capital.  Holding land and 
employment constant, an attempt was made to determine what other variables would yield a 
higher productivity when they also increased.  For the estimations, only statistically significant 
variables were used:  if a tree nursery was used, the number of plants per hole and whether 
traditional or highly technological methods were used.   
 
 










Production is measured in one hundred 
pound bags. 
To measure the productivity per worker, an 
additional variable was constructed: total 




N  Labor input  Labor is divided in: 
1)  Jornaleros or temporary workers. 
2)  Colonos or permanent workers. 
3) Administrative  worker. 
4) Total  workers. 
 
1) Temp Workers 
2) Perm Workers 
3) Adm Workers 
4) Total Workers 
L  Land input  
 
Land is measured by cultivated area 
(manzanas).  
Average height of each farm. 
Land 
Height 
K  Capital input  Capital is measure by seedtime, renovation 
and maintenance of coffee plants, through: 
1)  Number of plants seeded per hole. 
2)  Number of times plants are fertilized. 
3)  Use of traditional or highly technical 
methods of fieldwork and harvesting. 




1)  Plants per hole 
2) Fertilizer 
3) Hi-tech  methods 
 
4)   Capital 




Farms were divided into five regions, 
depending on its location, defined as follows: 
I. Eastern  Region 
II. Southern  Coast 
III.  Northern Region (Cobán) 
IV. Central  Valley 
V. Highlands   
REGi;  
i=index region   
 
U  Unionization  A dummy variable that is 1 if a firm is 





The location of the farms is a variable that makes it possible to identify differences in 
technology, socio-demographic and cultural characteristics, quality of land and climate.  The 
farms were divided according to their location into five regions, defined as follows:  
                                                 
8 This variable is a linear aggregation of the number of plants seeded per hole, the number of times plants are 
fertilized each year and whether the farmer uses traditional or highly technical methods of field work and harvesting.  
For estimation purposes in Section 5, this variable was used in this form and not on a per-worker basis, since it only 
measures fixed effects (for example, if a farm is considered to be more capital intensive than another) and dividing it 
by worker would only have been useful if there had also been a better measurement that also indicated changes in its 
slope. 
  201.  East: departments of Zacapa, El Progreso, Jalapa, Chiquimula, Jutiapa and Santa Rosa;   
2. South coast: departments of Escuintla, Suchitepequez, Retalhuleu, San Marcos and 
Quetzaltenango;   
3.  North (Coban): departments of Alta Verapaz, Baja Verapaz, Izabal and Petén;   
4.  Central Valley: departments of Guatemala, Chimaltenango and Sacatepequez;  
5.  Highlands: departments of Huehuetenango, Quiché, Totonicapán and Sololá.    
 
Table 7.  Variable Means and Standard Deviations* 
 
  All Farms  Non-Unionized farms  Unionized Farms 






Output 4,494.2  3845.8 4,288.6 3,846.5 6,063.6  3,778.6
Output/ 
Worker 
35.8 40.1 41.5 42.6 16.3 13.4
Temp  Workers  213.2 307.1 146.8 206.9 420.0 461.8
Perm  Workers  65.7 76.1 48.7 67.0 150.7 69.2
Adm  Workers  6.9 7.2 5.5 6.0 13.9 9.3
Total  Workers  287.1 345.4 201.1 245.2 584.5 447.2
Land 666.4  2043.0 289.3 229.4 2,098.6  4,084.3
Height 3,733.2  1191.6 3,915.0 1,114.2 3,381.2  1,282.2
Plants per hole  1.6  0.5 1.7 0.5 1.4  0.5
Fertilizer  2.5 0.6 2.6 0.5 2.1 0.6
Hi-tech 
methods 
0.6 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.5
Capital  4.6 1.1 4.8 1.1 4.1 0.9
Union 0.2  0.4  




Data on the existence of a union on the coffee plantations was obtained directly from the survey, 
and a dummy variable was constructed to capture this information.  Also of interest was 
information on any previous unionization efforts on the plantations, which is important in 
determining the percentage of plantations that have survived a union and to identify the means 
producers used to prevent the formation of a union. 
A total of eight unionized firms were interviewed.  Of these, four had a union throughout 
the full sample of nine years; one firm had a union from 1993 to 2000; two had a union for only 
five years (one from 1993 to 1997 and the other from 1992 to 1996); and the last had a union for 
  21only two years, from 1999 to 2000.  Seven of these firms are located in region two, and the other 
is in region four. 
 
4. Theoretical Framework 
 
Union Impact on Productivity 
 
The coffee data provides measures of output (Q) and four inputs: capital (K), land (L), work days 
of permanent workers (Np), work days of temporary workers (Nj) and work days of 
administrative workers (Na).  This information can be summarized and used to estimate the 
difference in productivity with and without a union, using the standard analysis of a production 
function (Chiang, 1984).  Therefore, it is assumed that the coffee production function is written 
in the following way: 
 
( 1 )        ) , , ( K L N AQ Q =  
 
Where Q denotes output, N is the effective labor input, L is land and K represents capital.  It is 
assumed that there are two types of workers: union workers, denoted by Nu, and nonunion 
workers, Nn.  Nn workers include permanent, temporary and administrative workers, while Nu 
can only include permanent workers.
9  Furthermore, it is assumed that productivity differs 
between unionized and non-unionized farms.  To control for this possibility, and thus to identify 
the union-nonunion differences that arise from cultural, geographical and idiosyncratic factors, a 
Cobb-Douglas production function is specified.  Equation (1) can therefore be rewritten as the 
following explicit function of labor and capital: 
 
(2)      
γ β α σ ) ( a p N N K L A Q ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ =
 
Where p stands for permanent workers and a for administrative. 
Following Clark (1980) and Booth (1995), the production functions for unionized and 
non-unionized firms can be written as:  
                                                 
9 The legislation recognizes administrative workers as trustworthy employees, who cannot be part of a union.   
Temporary workers cannot unionize since they do not have a long-term relationship with their employer, which is 
also demanded by union legislation. 
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where u and n indicates union and non-union, respectively.  The assumption that the production 
function has constant returns of scale (CRS) is given by: 
 
(5)     1 α βγ = ++ 
 
where γ is the elasticity of output with respect to labor.  
Equations (3) and (4) control for union/non-union differences in the production 
parameters, but within the two sectors technology and productivity may vary because of regional 
effects.  Dummy variables have been constructed to control for this effect.  Still, input ratios 
might have different effects on productivity in the unionized and non-unionized firms, so that the 
estimated union effect may depend on parameter differences and the level of the input ratios at 
which the union/nonunion comparison takes place.  Also, due to the limited number of 
observations, the union and nonunion parameters will be estimated jointly using interaction 
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10 In the empirical results this equation is estimated respecting the methodology presented in Clark (1980).   
Although, due to the length of the time series in the panel data, when every variable is interacted with unionism the 
efficiency gains relative to estimating separate regressions for union and nonunion firms are likely to be minor; the 
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The coefficients on the interaction terms provide estimates of the difference between union and 
nonunion parameters, while the nonunion parameters are given by the coefficients on the regular 
independent variables. 
 
5. Empirical Results 
 
Results of the Industry Productivity Equations without Union Interaction Terms 
 
As mentioned in the data description, for the industry productivity analysis, an unbalanced panel 
with data for 37 companies was constructed, consisting of nine years from 1992 to 2000.  A 
regression analysis was used to estimate a labor productivity function, for which the results are 
shown in Table 8.  These regressions are the estimation of equation (6) in Section 4, but without 
the union interaction terms.
11  The main interest is to estimate the effects of unions on the 
productivity of coffee farms.  The dependent variable is the logarithm of coffee production or 
output, per worker, and the values in parenthesis under the coefficients are the corresponding 
standard errors.   
The estimation method used for the first regression in Table 8 was pooled ordinary least 
squares (OLS).  This equation was estimated using data only from Region 2, where most of the 
unionized firms are located.  The purpose of estimating this equation was to establish a 
benchmark to which results for the whole country could be compared.  This group of farms is 
very similar in elevation, coffee variety planted, weather, landscape and socio-demographic 
characteristics.  Although these differences were controlled for using regional dummy variables 
in further estimations, it was unclear whether they would be sufficient to capture the information 
related to all of these differences. 
The results show that the union dummy has a negative and significant effect on the 
productivity of coffee farms.  As for the capital variable, the proportion of administrative 
workers to total workers, the amount of land to total workers and the elevation of the farm have a 
positive and significant effect on productivity.  The total workers variable is negative and 
                                                                                                                                                               
only constraint used to improve efficiency is equal error variance in the two equations.  Therefore in the empirical 
section an equation is first estimated without the union interaction terms. 
11 This was done considering the amount of data available, hoping to obtain a better appreciation of an overall and 
direct effect of unions on the productivity of coffee farms, before complicating the estimation by incorporating the 
union interaction terms. 
  24significant at the 5 percent level.  This could be indicating that some diseconomies of scale might 
be present. 
 
Table 8.  Results of Industry Production Equations  (without union interaction terms) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6  Dependent variable: 
Log(Output/ Total Workers)  OLS OLS OLS GLS OLS GLS 
-0.217 0.020 -1.289 -1.735 -0.014 -0.014  Constant 
(0.868)  (0.054)  (0.842) (0.565)* (0.023) (0.006)* 
1.178 1.719 0.690 0.702 0.608 0.943  Log (Capital)  
(0.281)* (0.325)* (0.188)* (0.090)* (0.184)* (0.107)* 
7.638 6.233 0.813 0.881 0.612 0.901  Log (Adm Workers/ Total 
Workers)  (1.506)* (1.970)*  (0.901)  (0.425)* (1.060)  (0.586) 
-0.244  -0.323 0.008 0.053 0.388 0.246  Log (Perm Workers/ Total 
Workers)  (0.422) (0.451)  (0.186)*  (0.095)  (0.219)**  (0.101)* 
0.328 0.249 0.398 0.479 0.296 0.556  Log(Land/ Total Workers) 
(0.058)* (0.058)* (0.047)* (0.042)* (0.052)* (0.039)* 
-0.180 -0.198 -0.256 -0.248 -0.353 -0.235  Log(Total Workers) 
(0.082)* (0.069)* (0.048)* (0.021)* (0.044)* (0.032)* 
0.250 0.129 0.481 0.511 0.376 0.242  Log(Height) 
(0.139)** (0.103)  (0.101)* (0.069)* (0.048)* (0.025)* 
-0.459 -0.198 -0.387 -0.235 -0.202 -0.107  Union  
(0.114)* (0.095)** (0.099)*  (0.072)* (0.068)*  (0.062)** 
    0.535 0.614 0.699 0.559  Region2 
    (0.109)* (0.059)* (0.120)* (0.069)* 
    0.359 0.443 0.567 0.401  Region3 
    (0.139)* (0.063)* (0.139)* (0.073)* 
    0.844 0.866 0.888 0.878  Region4 
    (0.128)* (0.077)* (0.138)* (0.080)* 
        
R-squared    0.716 0.888 0.715 0.980 0.950 0.948 
F-statistic    47.185 76.147 76.535  148.204  581.186  553.315 
Prob(F-statistic)    0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Durbin-Watson stat   1.136    0.701  1.005     
Total  panel  observations    139 139 316 316 316 315 
** Denotes significant at the 10 percent level. 
* Denotes significant at the 5 percent level. 
Values in parenthesis are standard errors. 
 
After an exploratory analysis of the results of this first equation, some of the firms 
revealed to be affected by some autocorrelation process.  Equation basically estimated again the 
first equation, except that it corrected for this autocorrelation problem.  It was corrected with 
generalized differences using an estimated value of the autocorrelation coefficient of each firm.
12  
The results are not significantly different from the previous equation, except that the union 
                                                 
12 Each correlation coefficient, ρ, was obtained from the corresponding Durbin-Watson estimator: DW=2*(1-ρ). 
  25coefficient is only significant at the 10 percent level and the elevation variable is no longer 
significant. 
Equation 3 has again the same specification as the previous one, except that the sample is 
expanded to include farms from all over the country.  Therefore, dummy variables for each 
region are also included.  The estimation procedure is pooled OLS and the standard errors are 
White heteroskedasticity-consistent.  Equation 4 has the same specification, but it is estimated 
using pooled generalized least squares (GLS).  As for equations 5 and 6, they are essentially the 
same as 3 and 4, except that they are corrected for autocorrelation using the generalized 
differences procedure explained above.   
The results did not vary much regarding the first two equations: unionization always has a 
negative and significant effect on productivity.  As for the other variables, capital and farm 
elevation are positive and significant at the 5 percent level.  In equations three, five and six the 
coefficient of permanent workers was positive and significant, while the proportion of 
administrative workers was not significant any longer.  Also, in all the equations the 
diseconomies of scale were present.  The dummy regional variables are also significant at the 5 
percent level in all cases.  The one with the highest effect on productivity was Region 4, which is 
the central valley.   
 
Results of the Industry Productivity Equations with Union Interaction Terms 
 
The results of the full estimation of equation (6) in Section 4, including the interaction terms 
between the union dummy and the other variables, are shown in Table 9.  The estimation method 
used in each equation is the same as those shown in Table 8.  The first and second column only 
include data for Region 2, equation one is estimated using pooled OLS, and equation two uses 
the same methodology, but correcting for autocorrelation.  Also, the equations are divided into 
two parts: the first are the results of the coefficients of the regular variables, which explain the 
changes in productivity in the nonunion farms, and the second set are the same coefficients, but 
interacting with the union dummy variable.  The coefficients on the interaction terms provide 
estimates of the difference between union and nonunion parameters. 
As for equation one, the union variable is not significant.  The interaction terms, however, 
show some interesting results: administrative workers are more relevant in explaining 
productivity, unions reduce the productivity of the land factor, and some diseconomies of scale 
  26may be present as well.
13  Of the regular variables, only administrative workers, land to total 
workers and total workers are significant and the signs of the coefficients are similar to those of 
equation one in Table 8. 
 
In equation two of Table 9 the union coefficient has a highly positive and significant 
effect on productivity.  The interaction terms nonetheless show that the effect of permanent 
workers, land and height is negative in unionized farms, contrary to what is seen in farms where 
there is no union present.  Also, the interaction term with capital is significantly larger than in 
non-unionized firms, indicating that capital investment has a larger effect on unionized farms’ 
productivity.
14  The interaction term with total workers indicates diseconomies of scale in 
unionized firms. 
Equations three and four in Table 9 are very similar to equation one, except that they 
include data for all regions, and regional dummies are included to control for this difference.  
Also, the estimation method of equation four is pooled GLS.  Equations five and six are similar 
to the previous two, except that they are also corrected for autocorrelation. 
 
                                                 
13 To estimate the economies of scale in unionized firms the coefficient of the interaction term of total workers with 
the union variable was added to the regular coefficient of total workers, and then added one.  If this value was less 
than one, then diseconomies of scale were present. 
14 Nonetheless, the causality of the capital variable is not quite clear.  According to interviews with coffee producers, 
union promoters specifically directed the unionization efforts toward those farms that already had high levels of 
technology and capital investment. 
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1 2  3  4 5  6  Dependent variable: Log(Output/ Total 
Workers)  OLS OLS  OLS  GLS OLS  GLS 
2.941  -0.060 -2.736 -3.597  -0.024 -0.036  Constant 
(1.464)* (0.087)  (1.091)* (0.569)* (0.033)  (0.011)*
0.248 1.524  0.904  0.887 0.905  0.823  Log (Capital)  
(0.367) (0.555)*  (0.183)* (0.088)* (0.181)*  (0.109)*
4.867  -2.520 -0.568 -0.457  -1.190 -0.033  Log (Adm Workers/ Total Workers) 
(2.810)** (6.955) (0.695) (0.348) (0.707)** (0.517) 
0.122 -0.475  -0.396  -0.153 0.113 0.018  Log (Perm Workers/ Total Workers) 
(0.543) (1.229)  (0.197)* (0.082)** (0.244)  (0.114) 
0.545 0.995  0.720  0.765 0.660  0.709  Log(Land/ Total Workers) 
(0.118)* (0.166)*  (0.056)* (0.028)* (0.056)*  (0.036)*
-0.342 0.424  -0.191  -0.173 -0.272  -0.179  Log(Total Workers) 
(0.094)* (0.106)*  (0.048)* (0.023)* (0.042)*  (0.033)*
0.142 -0.190  0.579 0.671 0.302 0.254  Log(Height) 
(0.179) (0.146)  (0.125)* (0.067)* (0.036)*  (0.025)*
7.232 45.604  17.579  30.051 9.808  23.310  Union  
(9.615)  (7.907)*  (15.141) (10.637)* (6.273) (8.747)*
6.763 18.391  6.181 9.179  4.379 7.935  Log (Capital)*Union  
(3.449)  (2.802)* (4.495) (3.332)* (1.830)*  (2.774)*
3.362 3.429  7.591  1.558 6.384  -0.675  Log (Adm Workers/ Total Workers)*Union 
(5.243)** (9.707) (3.497)* (1.580) (4.193)  (1.539) 
-1.751 -7.111  -1.203  -2.627 -1.043  -2.580  Log (Perm Workers/ Total Workers)*Union 
(1.416)  (1.714)* (1.724) (1.148)*  (0.810) (0.885)*
-0.487 -1.525  -0.692  -0.969 -0.607  -0.888  Log(Land/ Total Workers)*Union 
(0.251)* (0.276)*  (0.242)* (0.157)* (0.150)*  (0.139)*
0.492 -0.801 0.28 -0.136 0.197  -0.339  Log(Total Workers)*Union 
(0.227)* (0.426)** (0.196)  (0.123) (0.259)  (0.118)*
-2.479 -8.139  -2.985  -4.432 -1.796  -3.342  Log(Height)*Union 
(1.649)  (1.313)* (2.147) (1.616)* (0.860)*  (1.348)*
   -4.365  -6.050  -3.021  -5.004  Region2*Union 
    (2.906) (2.234)* (1.177)*  (1.866)*
   0.572  0.482  0.483  0.442  Region2 
   (0.106)* (0.064)*  (0.126)*  (0.072)*
   0.158  0.212  0.106  0.269  Region3 
    (0.140) (0.075)*  (0.168) (0.077)*
   0.835  0.735  0.759  0.750  Region4 
   (0.120)* (0.079)*  (0.134)*  (0.083)*
           
R-squared    0.762 0.788  0.775  0.765 0.943  0.938 
F-statistic    30.885  35.845 60.242 57.227 291.006  265.12 
Prob(F-statistic)    0 0  0  0 0  0 
Durbin-Watson stat   1.278    0.901  0.849     
Total panel observations   139  139  316  316  316  316 
** Denotes significant at the 10 percent level. 
* Denotes significant at the 5 percent level. 
Values in parenthesis are standard errors. 
  28The union variable is only significant at the 5 percent level in equations four and six.  
Contrary to what was expected, it has a positive sign.  Although the interaction terms show that, 
when a union is present, the productivity of land per worker and elevation diminishes, compared 
to non-unionized firms.  The land and height coefficients are always significant and positive in 
non-unionized firms.  Therefore, the more land per worker and the greater the elevation of the 
farm, the higher the productivity.  The presence of a union, though, cancels the positive effect of 
these inputs.   
Regarding the interaction terms, the capital estimation is almost always significant at the 
5 percent level and positive.  Also its value is significantly higher than that of the regular 
variable.  This implies that unionized firms rely relatively more on capital for productivity than 
do non-unionized firms.  Therefore, it can be expected that unionized firms might choose 
technologies that are more capital intensive to raise their productivity. 
When the proportion of permanent workers is significant, it is negative, both in unionized 
and non-unionized firms.  In both types of firms permanent workers cause a reduction in 
productivity.  This could explain a general trend within the coffee sector: to replace permanent 
workers with occasional ones, who are hired on a productivity basis and also allow for a more 
flexible work force.
15  As for administrative workers, the results are not very clear.  They rarely 
are significant, and in the case of non-unionized firms the sign is not stable.  In the case of 
unionized firms, when this coefficient is significant, it has a positive sign.  This might be 
showing the importance of administrative workers in managing and complying with the 
collective agreement with the union.  As for the value of the coefficient of total workers, it is 
negative for unionized and nonunionized firms, indicating that diseconomies of scale may be 
present.
16 
As for the regional dummies, Region 4 still has the largest positive effect on productivity, 
followed by Region 2.  As for Region 3, when positive it has a smaller effect on productivity 
                                                 
15 Permanent workers are those hired through a long-term contract.  They usually live on the same farm, and 
sometimes the same family has lived on the farm for several generations.  By law, they have a right to additional 
benefits and severance payments.  
16 An additional explanation of why the coefficient of permanent workers is so negative is that they usually help to 
solve a coordination problem within the firm, since they are the real experts in coffee harvesting.  In other words, 
they act as field managers for the landlord.  When a union is present they do not contribute to solving this problem 
since they have tenure as friends of the union leaders.  Also, this can explain why administrative workers are more 
important in unionized firms.  As to why this explanation does not appear in the non-unionized results, it might be 
that it would be necessary to control for administrative practices, for which information is not available. 
  29than Region 2.  It is interesting to note, however, that the value of the regular coefficient of 
Region 2 changed from positive to negative when interacting with the union variable.  Although 
this is a very productive coffee region, when a union is present, the regional effect becomes 
highly negative. 
To further understand the effect of unions on the productivity of coffee farms the 
productivity level (output per worker) was estimated at the means of the control variables, for the 
alternative values of the union dummy (zero for non-unionized firms and one for unionized 
firms).  The coefficients shown in Table 9 were multiplied by the corresponding observed means 
(Table 7), for firms with and without unions.  Line A) of Table 10 shows the estimated value for 
productivity when the union dummy variable is zero and line B) when the union dummy variable 
is one.  The values of these estimations when the union variable is zero are always higher than 
those when it is one.  In other words, when a union is present the overall productivity is lower.  
Therefore, it reinforces the results seen in Table 8, where the effect of unions is negative. 
 
Table 10.  Estimated Value of Productivity at the Means of All Control Variables 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
Dependent variable: 
Log(Output/ Total 
Workers)  OLS OLS OLS GLS OLS GLS 
    
A)  UNION =0  2.888 3.212 3.131 3.128  3.158  3.184
B)  UNION =1  2.337 2.237 2.747 2.815  2.762  2.780
 
Results of the Industry Productivity Equations with Fixed Effects 
 
Although there is some evidence that unionized establishments are less productive than non-
unionized establishments, this conclusion rests on an important assumption, namely, that the 
union coefficient is the measure of the productivity effect of unionization, assuming the absence 
of individual firm effects that are independent of union status and other determinants.  Without 
better information, and since productivity is a very permanent feature, when other determinants 
of productivity are allowed for, it is difficult to separate whether this is an effect of unions or of 
selection into union status of the less-productive firms. 
Therefore, we estimated another regression, holding constant firm specific effects for 
those firms where a union was present (equation one of Table 11). 
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Table 11.  Results of Industry Production Equations 
 
1 2 3  Dependent variable:  
Log(Output/ Total Workers)  GLS-FE GLS-FE GLS-FE 
0.035 0.025 0.034  Union 
(0.108) (0.091) (0.090) 
-1.565 -0.265 0.693  Log (Adm Workers/ Total 
Workers)  (0.715)* (0.080)*  (0.608) 
-4.112 -0.735 -0.466  Log (Perm Workers/ Total 
Workers)  (0.227)* (0.166)*  (0.259)** 
 -5.822  -0.714  Log(Land/ Total Workers) 
 (9.502)  (8.427) 
 -6.644  -1.579  Log(Total Workers) 
 (9.507)  (8.432) 
     
R-squared    0.792 0.881 0.888 
Durbin-Watson stat   2.292  2.411  1.759 
Total panel observations   63  139  316 
** Significant at the 10 percent level. 
* Significant at the 5 percent level. 
Values in parenthesis are standard errors. 
 
In equation one of Table 9, GLS with fixed effects are used to estimate the effect of 
unions on a panel data of eight unionized firms during nine years (1992-2000).  Five of these 
firms changed union status during this period.  The estimation method of equations two and three 
is the same as for equation one.  The difference in equation two is that all firms (union or non-
union) of Region 2 are included, and in equation three all firms (union or non-union) of all 
regions are included.  
The results show that the union coefficient is not significant in all three equations.   
However, compared to the previous equations it must be noticed that the specification of this 
equation includes other changes besides controlling for fixed effects.  It is possible only to 
establish a relationship between productivity and labor (administrative and permanent workers), 
land per worker and total number of workers.  Other production factors such as capital 
investment, height or regional dummies cannot be included, because they are constant over time, 
and including them would have perfect collinearity with the constant terms.  Still, the sign of the 
proportion of permanent workers coefficient is consistent with that of Table 9.   
  31When an attempt is made to estimate the effect of unionization on productivity using 
fixed effects, we cannot reach the same conclusions as before cannot be obtained.  This suggests  
that there might be additional effects that are not being taken into account in the analysis, such as  




Although several previous studies have analyzed the effects of unions on the Guatemalan 
economy, they are mainly descriptive in nature.  This paper represents a first attempt to quantify 
the effect of unions on a specific industry, namely coffee production.  Due to the lack of public 
information on coffee production, the data for this study was obtained only for large coffee 
producers.  Therefore, some of the conclusions may apply only to this type of business. 
Unionization in Guatemala is relatively low.  As the general perception among 
Guatemalan businessmen is that unions have a negative effect on firms, employers will engage in 
various activities to prevent the formation of unions in their firms.  Although it is difficult to 
form a union, once a union is established, it is very powerful since the country’s labor legislation 
is highly biased in favor of workers and unions.  Employers are obliged by law to negotiate a 
collective agreement with the union.  Moreover, the union can call a strike and, if a judge 
declares that the strike is legal and fair (for example, if the employer unjustly denied the workers 
a raise or any other benefit when he is able to grant it), the employer bears all the costs. 
The empirical analysis provides strong evidence that unions have a negative effect on the 
productivity of large coffee plantations.  First a productivity function was calculated, using only 
as independent variables a capital proxy, the proportion of administrative and permanent 
workers, land per worker, total workers, farm elevation above sea level and a union dummy.  
Using different estimation methodologies, the union variable had a consistently negative effect 
on productivity.  As for the other variables, when significant, they had a positive effect.  The 
only exception was total workers, which may indicate some diseconomies of scale. 
A second estimation included interaction terms between the regular independent variables 
with the union dummy.  As for the coefficients of the regular variables, the signs did not change 
significantly from the previous estimations.  Except now that, when significant, the union 
coefficient was positive.  Although, the productivity of variables such as land and elevation is 
  32reduced significantly when there is presence of a union within the firm.  Also, capital has a 
greater effect on productivity per worker in unionized firms than in non-unionized firms.   
As for permanent workers, when significant, both in unionized and non-unionized firms, 
they had a negative effect on productivity.  This can be explained by a deficient labor legal 
framework, where the laws are contrary to productivity considerations.  This confirms a trend in 
which farms are quickly substituting permanent with temporary workers, which are hired on a 
productivity basis.  Those firms that have lasted longer with an important permanent work force 
might be because there are important costs in this change, since severance payments can 
consume the capital of the firm.  Also, there is some evidence of increasing returns of scale in 
large non-unionized coffee plantations, but there is not enough evidence to say the same about 
the unionized firms. 
The coefficients of these regressions were also used to calculate the predicted level of 
productivity at the means of all the control variables, and for two alternative values of the union 
dummy (zero and one).  The results of calculating these values when the union variable is absent 
are always higher than those when it is present. 
  33Bibliography 
 
Albizures, M.A., Alianza Contra la Impunidad.  2001. Personal interview, Guatemala City, 
March 8.  
ANACAFE.  1997.  Los Cafés de Guatemala: Tradición, Desarrollo e Identidad.   Guatemala 
City, Guatemala.  
Banco de Guatemala (BANGUAT).  Various years.  Statistical Bulletins.  Guatemala City, 
Guatemala: BANGUAT. 
Barillas, E. 1997.  El Problema del Indio durante la Época Liberal.  Escuela de Historia, 
Instituto de Investigaciones Históricas, Antropológicas y Arqueológicas.  USAC, 
Guatemala. 
Batres García, A.R.C. 1980. “Importancia del Café en la Economía de Guatemala.”  Guatemala 
City, Guatemala: Universidad de San Carlos de Guatemala, Facultad de Economía.   
Thesis. 
Binmore, K., A. Rubinsten and A. Wolinsky.  1986. “The Nash Bargaining Solution in 
Economic Modelling.”  Rand Journal of Economics 17(2): 176-88. 
Black, S., and L. Lynch.  1997.  “How to Compete: The Impact of Workplace Practices and 
Information Technology on Production.”  NBER Working Paper 6120.  Cambridge, 
United States:  National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Black, S., and L. Lynch.  2000.  “What’s Driving the New Economy: The Benefits of Workplace 
Innovation.”  NBER Working Paper 7479. Cambridge, United States:  National Bureau 
of Economic Research.   
Boal, W.M. and J.H. Pencavel. 1994. “The Effects of Labor Unions on Employment, Wages and 
Days of Operation: Coal Mining in West Virginia.”  Quarterly Journal of Economics 
109:  267-98. 
Boletines de Estadísticas del Trabajo 1990 a 1999 del Ministerio de Trabajo y Previsión Social, 
Guatemala 
Booth, A.L. 1995.  The Economics of the Trade Union.  New York, United States:  Cambridge 
University Press. 
Brown, C., and J. Medoff.  1978.  “Trade Unions in the Production Process.” Journal of Political 
Economy 86(3): 355-78. 
  34Centro de Investigaciones Económicas Nacionales (CIEN). 1999.  Lineamientos de Política 
Económica y Social para Guatemala, 2000-2003. Guatemala City, Guatemala: CIEN.  
----.  2000.  “Reformas Laborales.” Carta Económica (213). Guatemala City, Guatemala: CIEN. 
Clark, K.B. 1980. “Unionization and Productivity:  Microeconometric Evidence.”  Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 95: 613-39.    
Ceto, P.  Congressman, former director Central de Unidad Campesina (CUC), and former 
member of the Unión Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (URNG). 2001. Personal 
interview, Guatemala City, Guatemala, March 15. 
Cochrane, D., and G.H. Orcutt. 1949. “Application of Least-Squares Regressions to 
Relationships Containing Autocorrelated Error Terms.” Journal of The American 
Statistical Association 44: 32-61. 
Código de Trabajo, Decreto 1441 del Congreso de la República y sus reformas, Guatemala, 1961  
Comisión para el Esclarecimiento Histórico.  1999.  “Guatemala, Memoria del Silencio.” 
Guatemala City, Guatemala: Oficina de Servicios para Proyectos de las Naciones Unidas 
(UNOPS).  
Consejo Nacional de Planificación Económica, Secretaría General.  1984.  Agricultura de 
Exportación, Población y Empleo en la Costa Sur.  Guatemala City, Guatemala: Jefatura 
de Estado.  
Contreras, C., ANACAFE Labor Lawyer. 2001. Personal interview, Guatemala City, Guatemala, 
March 2001. 
De León, J.C. 1989.  La Dinámica del Movimiento Sindical Guatemalteco. Guatemala City, 
Guatemala: Asociación de Investigación y Estudios Sociales (ASIES)/Editorial Piedra 
Santa. 
Fernández Molina, L.  1996.  Derecho Laboral Guatemalteco. Guatemala City, Guatemala:   
Editorial Oscar de Leon Palacios. 
Freeman. R.B. 1986. “The Effects of the Union Wage Differential on Management Opposition 
and Union Organization Success.”  American Economic Review  76: 92-6. 
Freeman, R.B. and J. Medoff. 1979.  “The Two Faces of Unionism.”  Public Interest  (57):  69-
93.  
Gibbons, R.  1992.  Un Primer Curso de Teoría de Juegos. Madrid, España: Antoni Bosch. 
  35González, L.E., Entrepreneur and coffee producer (Group A), ANACAFE former president.   
2001. Several personal interviews, Guatemala City. 
Greene, W.H. 1993. Econometric Analysis.  New York, United States: Macmillan Publishing 
Company.   
Grout, P. 1984. “Investment and Wages in the Absence of Binding Contracts: A Nash 
Bargaining Approach.”  Econometrica 52(2): 449-60. 
Hamermesh, D.S.  1986. “The Demand for Labor in the Long Run.”  Handbook of Labor 
Economics.  Volume 1. Amsterdam, The Netherlands: Elsevier Science Publishers.   
Instituto Americano para el Desarrollo del Sindicalismo Libre (IADSL). 1973. Historia del 
Movimiento Obrero Mundial.  Buenos Aires, Argentina: IADSL. 
Instituto Nacional de Estadística (INE). 2000.  Encuesta Nacional de Ingresos y Gastos 
Familiares:  Guatemala, 1999-2000. Guatemala City, Guatemala: INE. 
López Larrave, M. 1979.  Breve Historia del Movimiento Sindical Guatemalteco. Guatemala 
City, Guatemala: Editorial Universitaria.  
Machin, S., and S. Wadhwani. 1991. “The Effects of Unions on Organization Change and 
Employment.”   Economic Journal 101: 835-854. 
Machin, S. and S. Wadhwani.  1991.   “The Effects of Unions on Investment and Innovation:  
Evidence for WIRS.”   Economic Journal 101: 324-330. 
Mancilla, C., Secretario General Confederación de Unidad Sindical de Guatemala (CUSG). 
2001. Personal interview, Guatemala City, March 5.  
McCreery, D.J.  1987. “Café y Clases Sociales:  La Estructura del Desarrollo en la Guatemala 
Liberal.” Translation. Seminario de Integración Social Guatemalteca, CENALTEX, 
Guatemala City, Guatemala.  
McSweeny, J.F.  1988.  “El Subsector Café de Guatemala: Una Evaluación, 1988.” Guatemala 
City, Guatemala: Agencia para el Desarrollo Internacional (AID).  
Morales Modenesi, L.E., and Julio Celso De León.  1995.  El Movimiento Sindical Guatemalteco 
en 1995. Guatemala City, Guatemala: Instituto de Investigación y Autoformación Política 
(INIAP) and Fundación Friedrich Ebert, Guatemala. 
Pindyck, R.S. and D.L. Rubinfeld.  1991.  Econometric Models and Economic Forecasts. 3
rd 
edition. New York, United States: McGraw-Hill. 
  36Rolando, Oscar. Director of the Statistics Department.  Labor Ministry. 2001.  Personal 
interview, March 2001. 
Rubinstein, A. 1982. “Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model.”  Econometrica 50(1): 97-
110. 
Salanie, B. 1998.  The Economics of Contracts.   Cambridge, United States: MIT Press.    
Sánchez, M.R.  1968.  Historia del Cultivo del Café en Guatemala. Tomos I, II y III.   Guatemala 
City, Guatemala: ANACAFE. 
Schneider, P., H. Maul and L. Membreño.  1989.  El Mito de la Reforma Agraria: 40 años de 
experimentación en Guatemala.  Guatemala City, Guatemala: CIEN. 
TECNICAFE Asociados de Costa Rica, S.A.  1995.  “Manejo de Plantaciones de Café.”  San 
Jose, Costa Rica: TECNICAFE. Video 
Vásquez, D., Coor. Organización, and Irene Barrientos, Coor. Relaciones Internacionales.   
Unidad Sindical de Trabajadores de Guatemala (UNSITRAGUA).  2001. Personal 
interview, Guatemala City, March 1.  
White, H. 1980. “A Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Covariance Matrix and a Direct Test for 
Heteroskedasticity.”  Econometrica 48: 817-838. 
Zapata, A., Director of the Unión Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (URNG).  2001. 
Personal interview, Guatemala City, March 14.  
 
 
  37ANNEX 1.  DIAGNOSIS OF THE GUATEMALAN UNION MOVEMENT  
 
The Guatemalan union movement began in 1943. With the political opening and the labor 
legislation created during the Revolution of 1944, union movement arise stronger. Since the 
1950s, the number of union associations diminishes, surging again with the labor legislation 
approved in 1961.  
 
Table 12.  Union Enrollment by Year (1943 to 1999) 
 










Total  1389   1971  3 452 
1943 1  1  1972  3  456 
1944 0  1  1973 24  479 
1945 0  1  1974 58  537 
1946 0  1  1975 16  553 
1947 22  23  1976  14  567 
1948 22  45  1977  22  589 
1949 19  64  1978  16  605 
1950 25  89  1979  5  610 
1951 7  96  1980  9  619 
1952 23  119  1981  3  622 
1953 21  140  1982  2  624 
1954  7 147  1983  2 626 
1955  0 147  1984  5 631 
1956  1 148  1985  8 639 
1957 6  154  1986 22  661 
1958 0  154  1987 41  702 
1959 2  156  1988 65  767 
1960 2  158  1989 43  810 
1961 4  162  1990 60  870 
1962 5  167  1991 27  897 
1963 5  172  1992 48  945 
1964 5  177  1993 50  995 
1965 15  192  1994  42  1,037 
1966 37  229  1995 132  1,169 
1967 27  256  1996  41  1,210 
1968 48  304  1997  65  1,275 
1969 80  384  1998  76  1,351 
1970 65  449  1999  38  1,389 
    Source: Labor Ministry, Boletín Estadístico 1997. 
 
According to the Labor Ministry, in May 1999 there were 1,389 union organizations enrolled, 
with 94,878 affiliated workers, the majority concentrated in the Metropolitan Region and the 
Southwestern Region. 
 
  38Table 13.  Registered Union Organizations in the Labor Ministry 
Number of affiliated workers  




registered  Total %  Females  Males 
Total  1,276 97,523  100%  9,274  88,249 
Metropolitan Region  455 52,369  53.6%  6,401  45,968 
Guatemala 455  52,369  53.6%  6,401  45,968 
North Region  29  1,331  1.3%  62  1,269 
Baja Verapaz  4  190  0.1%  11  179 
Alta Verapaz  25  1,141  1.1%  51  1,090 
Northeastern Region  89 6,520  6.4%  761  5,759 
El Progreso  13  678  0.6%  91  587 
Izabal 61  5,131  5.2%  452  4,679 
Zacapa 3  134  0.1%  6  128 
Chiquimula 12  577  0.5%  212  365 
Southeastern Region  140 5,497  5.6%  271  5,226 
Santa Rosa  33  2,085  2.1%  84  2,001 
Jalapa 4  123  0.1%  21  102 
Jutiapa 103  3,289  3.3%  166  3,123 
Central Region  164  11,126  11.4%  571  10,555 
Sacatepéquez 13  459  0.4%  31  428 
Chimaltenango 64  3,137  3.2%  186  2,951 
Escuintla 87  7,530  7.7%  354  7,176 
Southwestern Region  328 16,026  16.4%  925  15,100 
Sololá 10  274  0.2%  17  257 
Totonicapán 13  505  0.5%  20  485 
Quetzaltenango 96  4,089  4.1%  422  3,667 
Suchitepéquez 76  4,263  4.3%  153  4,110 
Retalhuleu 49  2,554  2.6%  108  2,446 
San Marcos  84  4,340  4.4%  205  4,135 
Northwestern Region  61 2,844  2.9%  194  2,650 
Huehuetenango 39  1,586  1.6%  133  1,453 
Quiché 22  1,258  1.2%  61  1,197 
Petén 9  1,811  1.8%  89  1,722 
        Source: Labor Ministry, Boletín Estadístico 1997. 
 
As indicated in the following table, according to estimations of the Labor Ministry, although in 
1997 76.5 percent of unions operated in the private sector, less than 2 percent of the workers in 
this sector were affiliated with any union.  
 
  39Table 14.  Union Composition and Number of Members by Sector  
Unions, Federations y Confederations* (1997) 

























Private Sector  976  66,762 1.4% 5,012  61,750
Source:  Labor Ministry, Boletín Estadístico 1997. 
* A “federation” is a group of unions from the same sector, a “confederation” is a group of “federations”. 
 
Of the 1,389 union organizations enrolled in the Labor Ministry in 1999, only one third (35.56 
percent) were considered active organizations (with legal recognition and executive committee 
renovation).  
 
Table 15. Enrolled and Active Union Organizations, by Year and Number of Affiliates 
(1995-1999) 
Year  Enrolled  Organizations  Active Organizations  Total affiliated workers in 
active organizations 
1995 1,144  206  11,427 
1996 1,217  250  38,678 
1997 1,273  469  49,293 
1998 1,349  473  61,532 
1999 1,389  494  66,645 
Source:  Labor Ministry, Boletín Estadístico 1999. 
 
The right to unionize also extends to the employers. According to the Labor Ministry in 
1997, only four employer unions existed, which shows the little interest of this type of 
association from the employer side. For that same year there existed more than seven hundred 
unions in the industrial sector. 
 
  40Table 16.  Unions, Federations and Confederations 
Number of workers enrolled (1943 to 1997) 
  Number of affiliates 
Type  Enrolled by 
type  
Total  Female  Male 
Total 1275  97,523  9,274  88,249 
1.  Employers  4 149  49  100 
2. Type of Workers  1,271 97,374  9,225  88,149 
     a. Guild  76  6,008  479  5,529 
     b. Independent  489  23,291  1,882  21,409 
     c. Company  706  68,075  6,864  61,211 
Source: Labor Ministry, Boletín Estadístico 1997. 
 
  41ANNEX 2.  COLLECTIVE BARGAINING: A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW  
 
In order to understand the dynamics of negotiation in the coffee sector it is first necessary to 
understand first its history.  Coffee production started in 1845 when the Guatemalan Government 
took measures to foment it.  The promotion was the responsibility of the Consulate of 
Commerce, which also functioned as an exporting company.
17  Among other things, economic 
rewards were granted to those plantations that were the first to plant a certain amount of trees or 
to harvest a certain amount of coffee during the year (Rubio Sánchez, 1968). 
The transfer of public lands to private coffee producers was one of the measures adopted 
and explains the fast production growth during these years.  As can be observed in Table 2, the 
annual growth of the cultivated area between 1881 and 1893 was 0.65 percent.  During this 
period the government granted in property land owned by the State and expropriated land from 
the Catholic Church and indigenous communities.  Between 1877 and 1879 23,427 lots of 
between 1 and 10 caballerías
18 were granted to different owners (Batrés García, 1980). 
Although there was a big interest in cultivating coffee, mostly stimulated by the active 
support of the government, its growth was hindered by the lack of manual labor.  Because the 
plantations were located far from towns the coffee producers were forced to go to the highlands 
to recruit young men in order to clear part of the property and to construct their houses.   
However, this was not the fundamental problem.  There was not enough supply of manual labor 
to take care of the new plantations while their number continued to grow faster and faster (see 
Table 2).  
In market conditions, the relative shortage of manual labor requires the real wage to rise 
in order to attract more labor to the coffee sector.  However, this did not happen because since 
1871 the governments guaranteed the coffee producers the endowment of labor through various 
mechanisms.  One of these mechanisms involved called “los mandamientos,” orders issued by 
the political leaders of the department to the political heads of the indigenous towns to provide 
the plantation owners the necessary number of young men. 
 
 
                                                 
17 The Consulate of Commerce was in charge of agriculture policy for 50 years, until it was replaced by the 
Ministerio de Fomento in 1871  (Rubio Sánchez, 1968). 
18 The caballería is a local measure equal to 45.13 hectares 
  42Table 17. Population, Coffee Production and Cultivated Area with Coffee 
Annual Growth Rates 1/ 
Period  Total Population 2/ Coffee Production 
3/ 
Cultivated Area 
with Coffee 3/ 
1880-1893  0.74% 4.35% 0.65% 
1893-1921  1.03% 2.19% 1.06% 
1921-1940  2.64% 0.32% 2.22% 
1940-1964  1.12% 3.06% 2.63% 
1964-1973  2.08% 3.60% 0.64% 
1/ Includes the years in which population censuses were realized, except for 1950, when the information 
was manipulated.  
2/ Source: INE, various years. 
3/ Source: Rubio Sánchez (1968) and Batrés García (1980). 
 
Although wages in coffee production did not reflect the relative shortage of manual labor 
in this activity, the producers started offering various non-monetary benefits to the workers.  
These benefits were linked to the figure of a colono or a permanent worker, necessary to realize 
the maintenance activities of the coffee plantations (see Annex 3).  The producers created an 
incentive for the colonos to stay permanently on the plantation by providing them ,in addition to 
their wage, housing, food (maize, beans and others), education and other services.  They were 
also allowed to cultivate a piece of land and to use firewood. 
It is also important to notice that throughout the period 1880 to 1945, a formal collective 
negotiation process between worker and producers in the coffee activity did not for all practical 
purposes exist.  Labor relationships were regulated by private law, through work location 
contracts.  The first Law of Workers was approved in 1894 and regulated the forced labor of the 
workers on the coffee plantations.  However, during the beginning of the 1940s important 
changes in land ownership occurred which affected labor relations.  These changes were a result 
of the declaration of war in 1941 to Japan, Germany and Italy (Decree 2563).  In 1944 the 
Guatemalan State expropriated the lands of German residents (many of them coffee plantation 
owners), turning them into State properties.  
The approval of the Labor Code in 1945 formally established in a formal way the 
conditions that apply to labor negotiations.  The non-monetary benefits that were already offered 
to agriculture employees were formalized as minimum rights. This decision was important 
because these benefits now are part of labor costs, but are not linked to productivity.   
After 1945 a popular movement to claim the land ownership was initiated.  This 
movement was supported by peasants who saw unions as a way to realize their objectives.  From 
  431945 until now the union movement did not exist primarily as a way to improve monetary 
benefits but rather as a way to claim land for the peasants.  After 1960 some priests of the 
Catholic Church and the guerrilla movement adopted an important role by influencing unions to 
press for the land claim movement  (see Figure 1).  In 1960 the government began to give back 
the properties that were expropriated in 1944.  These were given back under different figures, 
such as 1) national agrarian patrimony, 2) return to their original proprietors, and the 3) national 
property.  However, the lands that were returned to their original owners were accompanied by 
the existence of unions, a situation promoted by the same State. 
After 1970 Guatemala entered into a phase when unions were repressed, as a result of 
efforts made to avoid that through a union the employees could take control of the property.  
From the 1930s to the 1970s monetary wages and non-monetary benefits increased by law, but 
favorable international prices for coffee allowed supporting the increase in costs.  However, 
when in 1979 the minimum wage was raised by 100 percent, further adjustments of the minimum 
wage without visible changes in productivity on the plantations caused an important change in 
the relative price between permanent and temporary manual labor.  This explains why after the 
1980s an important transformation in the composition of the manual labor in the plantations is 
observed, particularly reflected in a reduction of the colonos or permanent workers and an 
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  46ANNEX 3.  COFFEE PRODUCTION PROCESS 
 
Biologically the coffee is of biannual nature, one year the plant produces foliage and the next one 
fruit. There are techniques that are used to change the biological cycle of the tree and help it to 
produce every year; although, this shortens the economic life of the plant. What is more effective 
is the handling of shades and pruning. The soil for the coffee plant must have several chemical 
substances in good amount, like phosphate, nitrogen, potassium and lime.  Also, it must have a 
sufficient layer of humus, which is organic matter in a decomposition state. It is necessary to 
construct and to maintain in good conditions the water-drainage channels in order that if there 
were excessive rains, pools do not rot the coffee plants or generate plagues and diseases.  
 
The plantations must be cleaned without causing erosion of the ground. Other activities of 
ground conservation include: slope channels, “gaveteras” and barriers. 
 
In Guatemala the varieties of coffee that are harvested belong mainly to the Arabic coffees.  
They require lower temperatures and can be cultivated in the highlands. In general, the lifetime 
of this plant behaves in the following way:  
 
1º year, the plant only grows, without fruits 
2º year, the plant produces between 12 to 20 quintals of “gold” coffee by hectare.  
3º year, the first great harvest, between 90-180 quintals gold coffee by hectare.  
4º year, the harvest is between 50 percent and 75 percent less than the previous year, depending 
on how good it was the previous harvest. If during the third year it was low, in the fourth year 
can be the same or better. 
5º year, if the fourth was high, the fifth is low and vice versa.  
6º year, the plant must be pruned at 1 meter height, complemented with total side pruning of a 
distance of 50 percent or 75 percent from the base of the main stem. At the proper moment the 
plant has to be prune, choosing 3 or 4 offspring. The production falls substantially.  
7º year, is the best harvest and continues this way during the 8º and 9º years. 
 
Later when the plant is exhausted, a low prune (30 centimeters of height on two stems by stock) 
is needed.  This allows the plant to return to the first year of the life cycle. 
  47During winter, two prunes are made and the plant remains with three offspring by stock. In the 
following summer, the plant goes through a third and last pruning. Thus the second lifetime of 
the plant begins, which behaves just as the previous one and lasts between 8 and 9 years. When 
the plant becomes exhausted again, the whole process begins again. This allows the plant to have 
a life span of 24 to 27 years, when it has to be completely replaced.  
 
In addition it must be taken into account that there exist three systems of pruning: 
 
Selective by plant. It is the most common.  With this method, all plants or branches that have 
fulfilled their productive cycle, are ill or broken are pruned. The advantage of this system is that 
it does not demand harvest sacrifice and it produces more than the pruning by rows. The 
disadvantage is that it requires specialized personnel; intensity of pruning varies, therefore there 
is high variability between the harvests.  
 
Systematic by row.  A row of plants is pruned every year, every 3, 4, or 5 rows apart.   The cycle 
depends on the type of pruning in each farm. The advantages of this system are that specialized 
personnel is not needed, it allows chemicals and fertilizers to be dosed systematically and it 
allows for constant production year after year. The main disadvantage is that it prevents workers 
from pruning rows even when it is necessary or causes them to prune rows before it is necessary 
to do so. 
 
Systematic by lot.  The farm is divided into lots and the low pruning is alternated. This type of 
pruning has several advantages. A constant yield by plant is obtained, with higher production by 
area and higher productivity. This method is easy, fast, and economical (reductions in work 
represent savings of between 50 percent and 75 percent in operation costs); it also facilitates the 
functions of organic matter workings, “caladuras,” anti-erosion channels and other structures. 
Systematic by lot pruning additionally reduces competition among offspring, thus allowing 
natural control of blights and diseases, as plants have less competition. This method also allows 
the administration of according to the age of the offspring by lot and allows for the possibility of 
seeding alternating by rows. Finally, systematic pruning by lot permits the renewal of plants in a 
gradual and ordered form, with uniform maturation by lot, which facilitates harvesting and helps 
to stabilize production. 
  48ANNEX 4:  COFFEE PRODUCERS QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
CIEN is undertaking a research to investigate the impact of unions on the economic performance 
of Guatemalan coffee plantations.  The main objective is to verify the changes that may have 
taken place in the relationship between workers (union workers) and coffee plantation owners 
during the last twenty years.  We realize that it may take some time and effort for you to check 
the data in order to reply accurately.  We thank you for this and assure you that all information 
will be treated confidentially.  From April 2001 you will have access to the final results through 
our website www.cien.org.gt. 
 
I. Coffee producer information 
Name of the company.......................................................................................................... 
Name of the plantation…………………………………………………………………… 
Name of the person to contact............................................................................................ 
Telephone/Fax..........................................................E-mail.................................................. 
Coffee plantation number..................................................................................................... 
Address................................................................................................................................ 
State..............................................County.............................Zone or Village.................... 
Current plantation area (manzanas):  Total ............Cultivated .............. 
Height (above sea level):  Min....... Max....... 
 
II.   Production  
 
1.   What was the yearly production of your coffee plantation during the last 20 years, beginning 
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  49III.   Employees  
2.  How many workers did you have employed on your plantation?  (Please, indicate in the table, 
































P e r m a n e n t             
E v e n t u a l             
Supervisory 
employees 
          
T o t a l             
 
IV.  Workers associations  
 
3.  Is there any of the following worker associations in your coffee plantation?      
A.  Union      ________  B.  Solidarity    ________ 
B.  Other (specify)   ________   C.  None of the above ________ 
4.  In what year did the union or workers association started to form? ............................... 
 
5.  In what year did the union or workers association became legal? …………………….. 
 
6.  How many of the total do you estimate are affiliated to the workers association?  (Please 
indicate in the table, for each of the year, the number of unionized workers (or percentage of 





















P e r m a n e n t             
E v e n t u a l             
Supervisory 
employees 
          
T o t a l             
 
7.  Do you know if workers affiliated to the workers association pay an affiliation cuota?   
Yes..................    How much? …………… 
No ………….. 
  50I don´t know ……………. 
 
8.  Is there a collective bargain between the firm and the workers association? 
Yes..................   
No ………….. 
 
9.   From the collective bargain, do the workers affiliated with the labor association receive 
additional benefits to their wage and the basic benefits? Please describe extensively each of the 
additional benefits that you indicated, so that they can be quantified monetarily. (If it is possible, 
encloses a copy of the economic clause of the pact).: 






Others (please specify) ___________________________________________________ 
 
10. In a scale from 1 to 4, how would you describe the positive or negative influence of the labor 
association on the company in each one of the following issues, the year that it initiated? (1 is 
little and 4 are much, 0 does not affect). (Surveyor: clarify in this question that we need to know 
the degree of influence of the labor association when it initiated. The following question will 
evaluate the impact at this moment, because the same one could have varied, it might have 
become stronger or weaker). 
  A.  Positive   B.  Negative 
A.  Power of negotiation  12340 1234  
B. Wage determination  12340 1234  
C.  Hiring of new workers 2340 1234  
D.  Productivity  12340 1234  
E.  Utilities  12340 1234  
F.  Investment  12340 1234  
1
 
  5111. On a scale from 1 to 4, how would you describe the positive or negative influence of the 
labor association on the company in each one of the following issues, TODAY? (1 is little and 4 
is much, 0 does not affect).  
  A.  Positive   B.  Negative 
A.  Power of negotiation  12340 1234  
B. Wage determination  12340 1234  
C.  Hiring of new workers 12340 1234  
D.  Productivity  12340 1234  
E.  Utilities  12340 1234  
F.  Investment  12340 1234  
 
12.  Do you know if the union of your coffee plantation is affiliated with a national union 
organization?  
A.  Unión de Trabajadores de Retalhuleu (UTR)       ............. 
B.  Unión de Trabajadores de Quetzaltenango (UTQ)       ............. 
C.  Unión Sindical de Trabajadores de Guatemala (UNSITRAGUA)  ............. 
D.  Central de Trabajadores del Campo (CTC)        ............. 
E.  Central General de Trabajadores de Guatemala (CGTC)     ............. 
F.  Confederación Unida de Sindicatos de Guatemala      ............. 
G.  Fed. de Trabajadores Indep. del campo y la ciudad (FETICC)   ............. 
H.  Federación Campesina de Guatemala         ............. 
I.  Another  ..................   Specify .............................................. 
J.  I do not know  .................. 
K.  None     .................. 
 
13.  Do you know since when it is affiliated to another national organization?  
Yes    ...…………    since what year? ……………     No     …………… 
 
14.  Do you know if they have changed affiliation?       
Yes ................  No................ (go to question 15) 
 
15.  If there was a change, please indicate the change (from what national organization to what 
other and what year):  
  52 
V.   Wages 
 
16.  How much is the total payroll of your coffee plantation in each of the coffee years, 






















P e r m a n e n t             
E v e n t u a l             
Supervisory 
employees 
          
T o t a l             
 
 
17. Do the workers in your farm who are not affiliated with the workers association receive 
benefits in addition to the wages and benefits required by law? Please describe extensively what 
each one of the additional benefits that you indicated includes, so that they can be quantified 
monetarily. 






Others (please specify) _____________________________________________________ 
 
VI.  Technology and innovation  
 
18.  What variety of coffee trees do you have in your farm? 
Bourbon     Caturra 
Catimor     Other   
 
  5319. Do you use any special treatment for the young plants (nurseries) to be more productive?   
Yes.................No................(go to question 20) 
 
20. If you use special treatment, please describe it extensively.  
 
21. At what distance do you sow the coffee plants?  What is the distance between rows?  What is 
the distance between plants? 
One by one meters      One by two meters 
Two by two meters      Other (specify) 
 
22. How many coffee plants do you sow in a single hole? 
One per hole        Two per hole 
Three  per  hole     Other  (specify) 
 
23. What pruning system do you use? 
Systematic by acre      Systematic by rows 
Selective by plants      Other (specify) 
 
24.  How many times per year do you fertilize the coffee trees? 
 
25  What technological system do you have in your farm? 
Technical    Semi-technical  Traditional 
  54